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TIVISM AND ABSOLUTISM IN
BUL MANN'S DEMYTHOLOGISING
HERMENEUTIC
RE

by PROFESSOR JOSEPH R UNZO
the reliability of the kerygmatic tradition must not be
questioned, for otherwise the eschatological event to which
the kerygma testifies would be implicated in the relativity
of all historical knowledge. 1

as RudolfBultmann's demythologising hermeneutic has
irresistibly revolutionised biblical criticism, it has remained
an uneasy alliance between historical criticism and philosophical insight, and an uneasy duality between the exigencies of
historical relativism and the claims of the kerygma. An initial
examination of Bultmann's demythologising program will
expose a remarkable tension between the relativism of his
philosophy of history and the absolutism of his Christian
existentialism. I will then assess several prima facie contradictions which arise within Bultmann's thought from this
relativist-absolutist tension. I will conclude with a suggested
resolution of this tension between historical relativism and the
absolutist claims within Bultmann's theology. For only by
clarifying and dealing forthrightly with the serious conflicts
within the demythologising hermeneutic can we retain the
spirit of Bultmann's own admonition that in approaching the
mythological elements of the biblical world-view, 'absolute
clarity and ruthless honesty are essential both for the academic
theologian and for the parish priest'. 2
VEN

E

I

Bultmann's demythologising hermeneutic evolved from his
pastoral concerns. 'The real problem', he says in reply to Karl
Jaspers' critique of demythologisation, 'is the problem of interpreting the Bible and the teachings of the Church in such a way
1
Rudolf Bultmann, 'A Reply to the Theses of J. Schniewind', in Rudolf
Bultmann et al., Kerygma and M_yth: A Theological Debate, ed. Hans Werner Bartsch
(New York: Harper and Row, Harper Torchbooks, rg6r), p. I r6.
2
RudolfBultmann, 'New Testament and Mythology', in Kerygma and Myth, p. g.
A
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tFhat ,they may become understandable as a
or at a 11 costs the preacher must not
dark about what he secretly eliminate"
d ar k .ab out It
· .h'1~se1f ' .2 And despite ~,the
nor
locutiOn of ehmination-'dem
·
meneutic, motivated by this pastoral r>r..-.-. ... ,~-
construction: 'Its aim is not to eliminate
statements [from t~: Bible] but to interpret
The demythologising hermeneutic was
pastoral concern as Bultmann, looking back
conf~o?ted t~e acute 'problem of history' :4
relativity, rmsed by the historicity of human
compounded by the strictures which histori
ology places on any interpretation of the Bi
document. 5 Let us define a 'world-view' as
schema of all the cognitive elements which
experience-viz. primarily concepts and
interrelationships, the syntax and semantics
logic. Bultmann holds that each person li
lives within the world-view(s) of his or'her
historian investigates the historical biblical
perception of them is delimited by the co11ce:ot112
his world-view. 6 Yet the historian is
which were created within the conceptual
different world-view. For the cosmology of
Bultmann says, is mythological (essentially b
ofJewish apocalyptic and the Gnostic rec:len1ntion
the modern person is a technological ....,.,.,,.ct..-.·n.
scientific world-view. Hence, if the modern p
to take seriously the question of God, he
1
Rudolf Bultmann, 'The Case for Demythologization'
Rudolf Bultmann, M_yth and Christianity: An Inquiry into
without Myth, trans. Norbert Guterman (New York: N
2 Rudolf Bultmann, 'New Testament and Mythology',
p. g.
3 Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology (New Y
Sons, 1958), p. 18. cf. Bultmann, 'The Case for Demvtho,lm!"Iz;
Christianity, p. 59·
4 See Bultmann, 'The Case for Demythologization'~ in
5 See Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of thf!? .New 7i
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), val. 2,
6 See, for example, Rudolf Bultmarrq, Jesus and the
Smith and Erminie Huntress Lantero (New York: Charles
p. 3·
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'th the mythological element in Christianity' . And

w~ · toricity of both human experience and the Bible
ISdemythologisation of the Bible-a process which
a was begun within the New Testament itself,
and then more radically by John. 2 Precisely what
though, as Bultman~ pro~os~s in his famous essa,r,
ent and Mythology, to stnp the kerygma of Its
.j.;,.,,n1,P'Uilnl:·~>' jn order to 'demythologise it'?
is incautiously ambiguous in his use of 'demythoHe uses the locutions 'mythology' and, consequently,
··
in two different ways. Sometimes he defines
in terms of an imagistic way of using language, and
as the attempt to eliminate that imagistic
biblical documents in order to make the underlying
meaning of those texts evident. In this usage,
says that 'mythology is the use of imagery to express
Idly in terms of this world and the divine in terms
life', a and he refers to mythological language as
'. 4 Besides this imagistic sense of 'mythology',
also uses what we can refer to as the 'scientific sense'
In this sense, 'mythological thought regards the
, ... as an interference with the course of nature,
the life of the soul ... -a miracle, in fact'. 5 Bultmann
can call this conception of the world mythological
does not believe that the course of nature can
... by supernatural powers'. 6
whether 'mythology' is understood in the imagistic
sense, and whether one concomitantly 'demytholBible by eliminating metaphorical talk about the
by eliminating unscientific conceptions and explana'A Reply to the Theses of J. Schniewind', in Kerygma and Myth,
Jesus Christ and Mythology, pp. 32-4.

Testament and Mythology', in Kerygma and Myth, note 2,
Bultmann, History and Eschatology (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
, p. 12, and 'The Case for Demythologization', in Myth and
Christ and LVlythology, p. 21.
:S.uu:mann, 'Bultmann Replies to His Critics', in Kerygma and Myth,
Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 15 (cf. p. 38). Bultmann is careful to

is not simply what later turns out to be false: e.g. old and now
':iews are not 'myths'. (See Bultmann, 'A Reply to the Theses
, m Kerygma and Myth, p. 103.)
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tions, the reason for employing this neJrment~r
~orld-view wh.ich the modern person po:sse!;sm:
JUSt because of his or her place in history ·
the biblical world-view. 1 Foundationai IS
demythologising hermeneutic is his rp,~'r.,.......~;-~-;:.:...~<
relativity. Demythologising is necessary
bot~ because G?d should not be 'objectified'
ancient world-view as a fixed entity whose
manent and petrified, 2 and because humans as
possessing the world-view(s) of their own ~ge
confront God by attempting to use a world- :
their own.

II
We can use 'relativism' in its broadest sense
epistemological position which holds or entails tha
ness or incorrectness ofJudgments about matters of
varies with which individual cogniser, or which
cognisers such as a particular society or the
making the judgment. We can then refer to
which deny this as 'absolutist'. Bultmann nu·nsc~It!S:
about the meaning of 'relativism', but he essenti
this definition when he says in History and
relativism denies 'the absolute value of judgmen
ledge, and . . . [confirms] the dependence of all
valuing on their time and culture'. 3
Although, for reasons which will become
Bultmann resists the application of the term
own thought, he is a relativist in his general episte1rn
more particularly, he is a relativist in his philosoph
(Actually, since Bultmann holds that humans an~
historical beings, the relativism of his
becomes essentially the relativism of his general
1 For a discussion of some difficulties not considered here
Bultmann's ambiguous usage of'myth' see Ronald W ........:;;uu~uu.
and the Problem of Validity', in New Essays in Phitosophic·al
Flew and Alasdair Macintyre (New York: Ma~cm111an,
should be noted that Bultmann hofds that certain mytho,logicaJH
transcendence-can never be dispensed with ('A Reply to
Schniewind', in Kerygma and Myth; pp. 102-3).
2 Bultmann, 'The Case for Demythologization', in Myth and
3 Bultmann, History and Eschatology, p. 78.
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former thus largely implies the latter as well as the
the former.) Bultmann says that 'every interwith him certain conceptions, ... as presupposihis exegesis' .1 And in History and Eschatology, his most
statement ofhis philosophy of history, Bultmann says
interpretation of history presupposes a hermeneutic
and that, because of our 'pre-understanding' of the
consideration, each interpretation of history is
by the manner in which questions are put to the
documents in question. 2 Consequently, Bultmann
'the subjectivity of the historian is a necessary factor of
historical knowledge'. 3
this basic epistemological position that one necessarily
a subject matter, historical or otherwise,
s own (historically determined) point of view,
draws the relativist conclusion that there is no
historical knowledge in the sense of 'absolute ultimate
.4 And thus for biblical criticism, the theological
in the New Testament have meaning for us
... timeless general truths, but only as the expression
erstanding of human existence which for the man
also is a possibility for his understanding of
value are, then, relative-relative to one's histori~teJrm:'me:d world-view. We can summarise and give a

formalisation of Bultmann's relativist philosophy
by characterising the logical form which truth and
i:l~>"-'Lc;ulc;Hts would thus have as follows. On the view
t5uJltmLan.n expresses here, the form of a truth statement
, S, is:

Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 48.
History and Eschatology, pp. I I o, 1 I 3·
It is thi~ recognition that every interpretation of history involves
of the mterpreter which provides the philosophical foundation
pio:nee.lring .work concerning the necessity of using form and
to mvestigate the early church's own historical interpretation
in the biblical texts.
2!. The beginnings of this position were stated much earlier in Jesus
p. II).
Theology of the New Testament, vol. 2, p. 251.
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And the corresponding logical form of a :s~:a.tetne·nt ,nf-.
for a sentence, S, would be for Bultmann:
It is valuable ... on world-view W . .. that
IfBultmann is consistent in his relativist ep:tst<~mok)2~';."
every statement of truth and of value will follow
form of these two logical forms for sentences.
Thus, Bultmann's general relativist position
sentential operator with two components for
sentence. Those two components would be ....·.r.-..,--_""
operator, 'it ~s ~r.ue', or a valuation operator (e.g.
and the relatiVISing operator, 'on world-view W'
isi~g operator' I mean an exclusionary
·
w~1ch contrasts one set of cognisers, such asy'""0·nL"e'"'','sJ.,~J.£l;Jl. A.c
~VIth all other. cognisers. The relativity of the
judgments which the consistent application of
valuation, and relativising operators entails is a
relativity of correctness ofjudgments about matters
value which constitutes relativism broadly rn,nr~~;-t,.,.e:~;
With this formalisation of the logic of
J. .. J.Cl;i.u.! ~
relativist epistemology, we can see why he
Testament and Mythology' that 'the only criticism
Testament which is theologically relevant is that
necessarily out of the situation [particularly the
modern man'. 2 A person possesses a specific world,..
has been shaped principally by the historical forces
place in history. That world-view delimits the
and conceptions, arising out of one's -pi·e-1uncterstanctl!l
which one will approach the biblical texts.
Now, one might alter portions of one's worldfronted with sufficiently significant and persis
which are not satisfactorily accounted for
world-view. Yet we must always use, and so
our current world-view in order to assess and ., . . . ,..,. . . "'""'
elements for that world-view. One cannot,
world-views in toto the way one trades suits ofclO•tnJes~~,
4

.&J ..........

1 In order to prevent logical contradi~tions, there will neces~uiJ'~;
which will be excepted from the strictures of these relativising
e.g. the law of non-contradiction.
2 Bultmann, 'New Testament and Mythology', in Kerygma and
3 See ibid., p. 3·

to interpret the Bible by demythologising it, so as
the Bible meaningful to modern people, does not
a superadded and nonessential item of hermeneutical
For if one's world-view is formed within, and thus
by, the modern scientific world-view(s), that very fact
--'--·~""",·,ne, in part, the epistemic starting-point of historical
into the Bible. One cannot simply eliminate one's own
·ew and replace it with some composite of the worldof the early church. To reject the demythologising
tic totally is effectually either to deny the relativist
gy which the historicity of human experience seems
upon us, or to deny that there is any literal sense in
of the mythological elements of the Bible. Conversely, to
a demythologising hermeneutic is, and is no more than,
·ust to hold that the message of scripture and the church
to any specific, historically determined world-view;
say (following Matt. 28. I g) that the kerygma is for 'all
, whatever their place in history.
III
te the relativism of his philosophy of history, Bultmann
radical relativism. (This is why in History and EschaBultmann rejects the term 'relativism' to describe his own
)1 Thus in Jesus and the Word Bultmann offers two
reasons, one of which he later rejected, for saying that
cal criticism 'does not end in complete relativism, as if
were a spectacle wholly dependent on the individual
· t of the observer' .2 First he says that the observer's
ositions, which are true relative to his world-view, must
ed, 'that history may actually speak'. But as we have
,,.B111t1:nann later does reject this view and holds instead that
niS1tOrtcal investigation always involves the world-view and
hermeneutic of the historian. Second, however,
enunciates an absolutist framework which encomhis general relativist philosophy of history, by making the
·
which he retained, that certain parts of history can
asped by objective methods. In Jesus and the Word he
ts, for example, that the correct chronological sequence
2

1 Bultmann, History and Eschatology, p. r 36.
Bultmann, Jesus and the Word, p. 4 (italics mine).
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of historical events can be comprehended
methods.
, .c: •More importantly, in 'New Testam ent
I
o ogy, 10r Instance, he talks about the use ofn"'''"""T•·"-'to preserve the truth of the New Testament
first of these two absolutist claims about history ·
and the second, while central to Bultmann's theol IS
·
· d Ill
· t h e lOrm
.c:
•
•
ogy1
mamtaine
Ill
Which
Bultmann nri'>C<A1r.~~·
!h~ chronological order of historical events is not
objective fact. In the first place, there are no
simpliciter; there are only historical facts relative to th
struc~u~e of the world-_view of the inquirer. I am n~t
t~at I~ Is extremely difficult or impossible to isolate
h:stor:cal events and their temporal relationships
~Istoncal ~ocuments are themselves tightly in.,_~><,.i-T ..•,. . .
InterpretatiOn. Rather, since semantic meaning is
one's world-view, there are only historical 'facts' qua
which someone perceives them. Hence, I think
wrongl_Y su~ges.ts that 'strict methodological
recognise objectively ... events in so far as they are
2
occurrences' . For the character, and hence the 1'c1en.tlt'Vl\
particular historical 'event' is ir: part determined by
ceptual structure of the world-view of the inquirer.
matter, the conceptual structure of the inquirer's
even determines the criteria-e.g. duration, rela
parts, etc.-for what counts as an 'event'.) As
example, and one which Bultmann would readily
only be a historical 'fact' for oneself that Jesus was an:
if one believes that exorcism is possible.
Likewise, and in the second place, if we can
of historical inquiry only in terms of the worldinquirer, then in some instances a chronological
historical events may not even be within the ,......, .,..,.,... . . . . .~
possible. It can only be a 'fact' that certain
particular temporal relation to each other if such
'chronological' are semantically meaningful wi
ceptual structure of the inquirer's own world-view.
neither what historical events occurred, nor the order,
1

ibid., p. 5, and Bultmann, 'New Testament and Mythology',
M_yth, p. IO.
2
Bultmann, History and Eschatology, p. I r6 (italics mine).
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. t ·cal events occurred, can be absolute, objective facts.
hIS
on
.
,
h
h

bsolutist aspect In Bultmann s thoug t-t e
second a
1
·
·
f
th
truth
of the New Testament proc amat10n-1s
0
on ~is constructive aim. of identifying the foundational
ofthe New Testament and its mythology. Bulti?~nn
any claim for the. absoluteness, of t~~ C~nstmn
He argues directly against Tro:Itsch s pos~t~on ~n, say,
soluteness of Christianity and the Hzstory ohif RelhzgzonCs,h :V~en
that it is meaningless to hold t at t e
nstmn
hich is a historical phenomenon, is absolute in the
w essing the 'highest rank' and being of 'irreplaceable
human culture'. Yet Bultmann subsequently asserts
uteness of the Christian faith with respect to the
which it demands of the believer. 2 This absolutist
tes a contradiction within Bultmann's own thought.
while recognising historical relativity, Bul~mann m~kes
· t claim because he wants to avmd a radical
which he feels would deny the compelling claims of
. Now certain kinds of absolutist claims are comwith a relativist epistemology of the sort which Bultmann
in generaL In this regard, it will be helpful to disfollowing the work of Rudolf Carnap, between two
questions of existence vis-a-vis world-views. 'Internal
' are those questions which concern the existence of
given the logical structure of a specified world-view.
questions' are questions regarding the existenc~ of
specified world-view in itself. 3 Most non-meta-logical
of truth and value (including the presuppositions of
inquiry) are internal questions, which presuppose the
structure of the relevant world-view. On a relativist
•'YY'Ir>~nnru, the truth or falsity, and the logical or empirical
or contradiction, of answers to these internal questions
and value are relative to, and dependent on, the logical
of the world-view in question. So within a relativist
, internal absolutist claims are perfectly sensible and
;Ui:J\.n..,..•-~~

Troeltsch, The Absoluteness of Christianity and the History of Religions,
· (Richmond, Va.: John Knox Press, I 97 I), p. r I 7.
'The Case for Demythologization', in Myth and Christianity, p. 71.
Carnap, 'Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology', .in Seman_tics. and the
of Language, ed. Leonard Linsky (Urbana, Ill.: Umv. of Illmo1s Press,
20gf.
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coherent in so far as they are regarded as
within the world-view which they presuppose-. """"-''"UI;t='
But Bultmann's absolutist claims are not mad
absolutist claims, and consequently his
e
contradictory. For the difficulty with Bultmann'
claim.s about the Chdsti~n faith is that they · 8
questwns, yet they are, ultimately, cast in unres:tri,cted
terms. Thus, Bultmann treats certain absolutist
the kerygma as logically prior to and as en<~on r
general, and otherwise consistent, relativity ofhis
history.

1

IV
Bultmann's insistence on the inviolateness of the,
tradition-so that the eschatological event to which it
not 'implicated' in historical relativity-rests on
absolutist claims. Bultmann holds that the
kerygma, or of the Christian faith, is absolute.
this claim is founded on as well as foundational for
hermeneutical circle here) the further claim that
ism's, and particularly Martin Heidegger's, und
human existence is correct, absolutely. Bultmann
to hold that 'to speak of faith in the living God
presence in Christ is pure myth unless these things
existentialist interpretation' .1
In assessing the contradiction which these absol
engender within Bultmann's thought, it should first
that Bultn1ann's arguments for an Existentialist ·
of human existence, and therefore of the kerygma,
circular. In Jesus Christ and Mythology, he argues:

every interpreter brings with him certain conceptions, .
suppositions of his exegesis, ... Man's life is
search for God because it is always moved, coJnsc:lQt
unconsciously, by the question about his own
existence ... the adequate way to put the qu ......, .....·..
interpret the Bible ... is, how is man's existence
the Bible? . . . Existentialist phiLosophy, ... -------·-, .existence my own personal responsibility, and
TYli''\'UP•ri .·

J.L.L .........

1

p.

Bultmann, 'A Reply to the Theses of J. Schniewind\ in
(italics mine). cf. p. I ro.

105
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to make me open to the word of the Bible.
follows that existentialist philosophy can offer
te conceptions for the interpretation of the Bible,
the interpretation of the Bible is concerned with the
1
10 ~ 1 :~L·~....., ...• ng of existence.
formalise Bultmann's argument as follows:
central human questions-e.g. the
for God-in essence involve
erstanding one's own existence.
interpretation of any text
, .. -.-~,, ...,.., some presuppositions for the
ouc;:;L..LU~L" addressed to the text.
, in interpreting the Bible,
must [at least] ask how human
.,.v~~--- is understood there.
E}iJSten:na.nsin makes the question of
personal existence my respon-

Presupposition

Presupposition

Conclusion
from I and

2

·\.i.l>.......

Definition

y.
, Existentialism helps the
interpreter to be open to what the
'ble says about human existence.
Therefore,
Existentialism offers
uate philosophical conceptions
biblical exegesis.

Conclusion
from 3 and 4
Conclusion
from 3 and 5

ly, premise (I) is a critical premise here. It is necessary
subordinate conclusion in line (3), and it is thereby
both for the second subordinate conclusion, (5), and
principal conclusion, (6), of the argument. But (I) is
a statement of the Existentialist position (re-expressed
. Thus, Bultmann commits the fallacy of petitio principii
pposing this Existentialist position as part of his argument
adequacy of that same Existentialist analysis for biblical
is not surprising, however, since Bultmann himself
that every interpretation necessarily involves some
uppo:sitions, and thus necessarily involves some world-view.
1

Bultmann, Jesus Christ and .Mythology, pp. 48, 53, 56, and 57·

412
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Regarding his own view of biblical exegesis, he says that

necesSary for biblical exegesis,
. and this is just a statement
h
neutical principle which Bultmann feels compelled
frm~n the face of historical relativism. But it is an
emp oy different matter for Bultmann to hold that 'our task
· · InterpretatiOn
·
· of t h e ... my th eruce an existentialist
d
pro
'1
d
h
of the New Testament an t at

I think I may take for granted that the right question
frame with regard to the Bible-at any rate within
Church-is the question of human existence. I am
to that by the urge to inquire existentially about my
existence. 1

But this is simply an expression of Bultmann's own world ·
The fact that Bultmann himself feels compelled to use
Existentialist position in his biblical exegesis obviously does
entail the necessity of using that philosophical position as
every foundational world-view for any biblical exegesis.
Turn now to this more damaging problem: Bultmann
tradicts his own basic philosophy of history, and its
epistemology, by arguing from the espousal and u~ .......... UJLv.:>.:~
himself of this Existentialist analysis, to the suggestion that
world-view which does not use such an Existentialist
can only produce a mythological interpretation of the
The danger and inevitability of a mythological inrpy·n. . ..,t-..,+-.;~~··
the Bible if one uses a different world-view may appear
from within Bultmann's own Existentialist world-view. Yet
the same conclusion follow from the world-view of every
biblical exegete? Empirically, this question must o ·
answered negatively. But the crucial issue here is a logical
not an empirical one. Bultmann unqualifiedly accepts
Existentialist analysis as a foundation for biblical exegesis,
insists on the absolute truth of the (demythologised)
These positions are logically inconsistent with the
epistemology which he employs in claiming that, in
other matters of truth and value are governed by
sentential operators. However laudable, Bultmann's
insulate the kerygma against relativity is purely ad hoc on
has proposed his relativistic epistemology in recognition.
historical relativity.
It is one thing for Bultmann to say that the purpose
demythologising hermeneutic is to interpret, not elimina
mythological elements of the Bible and so to make the
faith clearer to modern people~2 Some 1nethodological
1

2

Bultmann 'Bultmann Replies to f·Iis Critics', in Kerygma and Myth, PP·
Bultmann; 'The Case for Demythologization', in 1\ifyth and Christianity, P~

e are concerned with is the 'right' philosophy.
w The 'right' philosophy is simply one which has
w~rked out an appropriate terminology for the under2
.
standing 0 f existence.
has clearly ignored his own injunction against the
,unHJ.a,ut.h.uat the New Testament expresses 'ti~e~ess general
Furthermore, it is just this self-contradicting attempt
.k absolutist claims about Existentialism, which leads
e to offer the futile circular argument, d'Iscusse d a b ove,
. . ,rna
. . _~..,.,..,...,
the necessity of employing Existentialist conceptions for
exegesis.
.
.
.
.
'ng this difficulty with his absolutist claims about
·"" .:_ . . ,.~.,_.,, ·
an analogous difficulty arises with Bultmann's
':trt•Pntarlce or' the absolute demands of Christian faith. Bultconcludes History and Eschatology by saying that:

meaning in history lies always in the present, and when the
present is conceived a~ th.e e~chato~ogica~ pr~sent by
Christian faith the meanmg In history IS reahsed.
as Bultmann himself declares in his Theology of the New
about the historical inquiry involved in biblical
theological investigator obviously cannot presuppose
his own faith as an epistemological instrument and make
of it as a presupposition for methodological work. 4
beings are historical beings, subject to the forces of
relativity. How could one be certain that the
faith gives meaning to history for everyone? On
. -u,LUI..JLJ.J..a. u.tJ.'s own relativist philosophy of history, one could not
J\- ..........u .........

1

Bultmann,
Bultmann,
Bultmann,
'Bultmann,
2
3

'New Testament and Mythology', in Kerygma and Myth, p. 16.
'Bultmann Replies to His Critics', in Kerygma and Myth, p. I 93·
History and Eschatology, p. I55·
Theology of the New Testament, vol. 2, p. 241.
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know this absolutely; and indeed, this claim abo t th
meaningfulness of Christian faith is simply on u . e
Christian faith itself.
e

v

T~is. cc:nflict which arises in Bultmann's thought
relativist Impetus for demythologising and his own
to Existentialist principles derives in part I
Bultmann's conception of 'the modern scientific H'"'·' .......
a. relatively monolithic phenomenon. Bultmann
dichotomy between 'the' mythological-ancient ur.-..... ,~. ~c
'the' s~ier:tific-modern world-view. Starting from
to~y: It Is easy to suppose that, if focusing on
pnnCiples and the search for the meaning of human
helps many modern people to understand the Bible
will help all modern people since they all share th~
scientific world-view. However, recent
philosophy of science indicate that it is not correct to
scientific world-view.
Thomas Kuhn has argued persuasively in The
Scientific Revolutions that throughout history,
advanced by means of successive changes in the
'paradigms' of the community of scientists. Kuhn
science does not consist of the slow accretion of facts
but of radical and revolutionising shifts of
Regarding such scientific revolutions, he says that:

when the normal-scientific tradition changes, the
perception of his environment must be re··ectucat<::CI
some familiar situations he must learn to see a new
After he has done so the world of his research
here and there, incommensurable with the one
inhabited before. . . . [This is a] reason why
guided by paradigms are always at cross-purposes.
Science has, then, evolved in such a manner that
world-views are incompatible with earlier
views. 2 Consequently, within the complexities of
century, there is no single scier1tific world-view.
is a set of incompatible worlq-views, some held by
Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
2 See esp•eCll:tllY
Chicago Press, 1962), p. 1 I x.
1
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older scientific world-views, and some held by scientists
world-views are incompatible with other new
world-views. And given the historical factors affecting
scientific paradigms, science, like all human endeavors,
on within the strictures of historical relativism: there
scientific facts, simpliciter, but only the 'facts' given a
scientific world-view.
demythologising the Bible, whether in the
or scientific sense, is not as simple a task as either
.~ •• .,.+,,ncr language which does not talk about this world or
explanations which do not correspond to the
·scientific world-view. If the scientific community is so
in its world-views, how much more are 'modern people'
in their world-views. Moreover, as Kuhn points out,
resisting a new scientific paradigm there is no
which resistance becomes illogical or unscientific' .1
of scientists hold a scientific world-view. Just so as
their world-views are internally consistent and coher~nt
cannot, on the basis of his or her own modern world~
someone holding another, contrary modern worldbeing inconsistent or incoherent. In sum, Bultmann
more correctly claim that there is only one scientific
· than he can claim that a modern person is illogical
onsiiSt(~nt merely because he or she does not subscribe to
xis1:entla.llst world-view-or does not find the meaning of
in the Christian faith.

VI
's own attempt to reconcile his general relativist
.....,,.,.,,.,.,..,,.. with his view of the absolutist demands of the
fa~th f~ils. In J~sus Christ and Mythology he suggests
histoncal relativity necessitates demythologisation of
texts:
itself demands to be freed from any world-view
d by man's thought, whether mythological or
For all human world-views objectivise the world
,n-n,...•• .,. or eliminate the significance of the encounter
personal existence. 2
rs8.
Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 83. cf. Bultmann, Kerygma and Myth,
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According to Bultmann, then, even while Christ· ~ .
b'
. .
Ian 1atth
. .
a bbs?1ute, It his not su pect to relativism precisely because
su ~ect to t e vaganes of any world-view. This ·
though, e~abl~ Christian faith to escape the gener:~ew
Bu~tmann s philosophy ofhistory, because any possib_l,.e.._,..,"''"'
wh~c~ a person may have to the kerygmatic
delimited by that person's world-view.
The significance
of the
.
. kerygma for oneself depen d s
on t h e semantic mearungfulness of the proclamat1'
· t h ere wou ld be no content to respond to in theon.
wise,
tion'. Bultmann recognises this, although he does not
the full implications of that recognition, when he says
If faith in the Word of God can only be the work f
Holy Ghost operating through intelligent decisi~n
follows that the understanding of the text is attainable '
ir: system~tic interpreta~ion, and the terminology
directs this understanding can be acquired only
profane reflection .... 1
But further, the semantic meaningfulness of the
for oneself depends on the conceptual structure of one's
world-view. Therefore given Bultmann's
the historical rel~tivi.ty of world-views, the possibility
ceptance, or of reJeCtiOn, of the kerygmatic proclama
depend on, and vary with, one's world-view. (And
literally, for some people the proclamation will ha
any further enrichment of their world-view-no sigonitic
because it will be semantically meaningless.)
So the Christian faith too is caught in the relativity
historicity. It is futile for Bultmann to enjoin 'those
the modern world-view [to] live'-with respect to
faith-'as though they had none' .2 But then, how can
cile the absolutist claims of the kerygma with
relativity?
VII
'Objective, critical reflectiqn' will not, as Bultmann
provide a set of objectively 'correct' hermeneutical
1

Bultmann, 'Bultmann Replies to His Critics', in Kerygma and Myth,
2 Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 85.
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exegesis. We have seen that Bultmann himself fails
.......... ~·-h-e must fail-in presupposing his own Existentialist
in his search for the 'correct' hermeneutical prinWe must assume some world-view in biblical exegesis
to be consistent, we must acknowledge the relativity of
that world-view even as we confront the Christian
tion. Thus in order to avoid self-contradiction,
'sown general relativistic philosophy of history would
him to hold concomitantly that (a) the philosophic
'tions which one holds in one's biblical exegesis are
to the same relativity which governs the assumption of
world-view, and that (b) response to the Christian faith is
delimited by one's world-view. Yet here biblical exegesis
the Christian faith are no different from science or history,
any other human e_n~eavor or ~aith: _we can never sever
from the relativity of our histonCity. And, moreover,
......--~·~ . . . 's fundamental intentions are in fact compatible with
more radical relativity of (a) and (b) which he denies but
actually foHows from his own relativistic philosophy of
1

holds that it is 'only by faith that God is enas Person', 2
that this faith-encounter comes
the kerygmatic proclamation. For Christ, Bultmann
, 'meets us in the word of preaching and nowhere else'. 3
first, that proclamation can only come to us in human
, using human concepts with all their historical and
relativity. And second, relativity will also condition
s response to that proclamation. In short, the very possiofresponse to the proclamation rests on internal questions
rvo1v'mv one's own historically relativised world-view. Yet
tible with the pastoral motivation for Bultmann's
.emlvtllol,oglSinlg hermeneutiC-where the task is to discover how
ew Testament can be meaningful, and the kerygma tic claims
otnoellm~r.for modern people. And this is also compatible with
insistence that 'it is only when there is no ... objective
that faith acquires meaning and strength'. 4
Reply to the Theses of J. Schniewind', in Ker_ygma and Myth,
.tsu:ltm~tnn, 'New Testament and Mythology', in
.tlultm<:mn. 'The Case for Demythologization', in

and Myth, p. 41.
and Christianity, p. 6g.
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Furthermore, within this more consistent
Bultmann's relativistic epistemology, it will still be
hold that the demythologised kerygmatic
absolute. But it is only absolute in its demand for
those who, within the strictures of their own world
understand the demand and are able to respond.
only sense in which 'wherever a revealed faith
asserts, and must assert, the absoluteness of its
More precisely, this relativising of the absoluteness of
faith has the logical form:
It is true (or valuable) ... on world-view W . ..
demand to decision of the Christian faith is absolute.
And this logical form provides a model for rec:on~ciliJ
central relativist and absolutist elements ofBultmann's
For, relative to the world-views of those who could
consistent application of the strictures of this logical
account both for the absolute claims of the kerygma
relativist epistemology like Bultmann's which
human relativity. The demands of the faith will
accounted absolute. But as William] ames would have
proclamation is absolute, but only absolute for those
it is a 'live option'. 2
Yet at the same time, to the extent that discourse
within the logical (or linguistic) bounds of those ................ ~ ..
which the demand to decision of the Christian faith is
the relativising sentential operators of a relativist
like Bultmann's need only function implicitly. The
sentential operators of a relativist epistemology
import from the comparison of one world-view with
from the examination of a single idea from the point
different world-views. Hence, whenever both the
the hearers possess world-views on which respohs
demand to decision of the Christian faith is possible,
statements about the demand to decision will not
relativist epistemology-as long as relativising
operators implicitly govern t4ose statements.
2

1
ibid., p. 67.
See Section I of William James's essay, 'The Will to

VIII
the exigencies of historical relativism, Bultmann
reserve the meaning of the New Testament
to Pby demythologising
· · It.
· H e speci'fi ca11y h opes to
tion
b t reinterpret the mythology of the New Testament
u that for modern people the meaning of the New
mythology is its expression of human self~-·"'"",...· One may or may not be able to accept
own Existentialist world-view or his view of which
:tions of the New Testament are mythological for
po a modern person. For the acceptability of philoaspresuppositions, and the possi'b'l'
IIty of r~sponse to .th.e
faith are relative to our own world-views. Yet 1t Is
we d~ not have the same world-views as the worldhich inform the biblical texts. 'It is only through the
tion that the cross can become a personal encounter,' 1
If this is so, then indeed if there is to be any
that the Christian faith will be meaningful for us, the
:u.~.................. ~~ must be demythologised-even as we recognise
philosophical presuppositions ~?ic~ we employ in that
conditioned by our own re]atiVIty.
'A Reply to the Theses of J. Schniewind', in Kerygma and Myth,
indebted to Gordon Kaufman. an~ Ge~rge MacRae, whose comments
clarify several of the issues ra1sed m thrs paper.
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